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Abstract Aspectual shape is widely recognized property of intentionality. This
means that subject’s access to reality is necessarily conditioned by applied concepts,
perspective, modes of sensation, etc. I argue against representational and indirect-
realist account of this phenomenon. My own proposition—presentational and direct
realist—is based on the recognition of historical contexts, in which the phenomenon
of aspectuality should be reconsidered; on the other hand—it is based on Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s conception of aspectual perception. Moreover I apply some results
from the area of logicophilosophical investigations called qua theory.
Keywords Aspectual shape  Representation  Presentation  Qua 
Perception  Wittgenstein
1 Introduction: Aspectual Shape, Representation and Realism
According to some philosophers, our acquaintance with the world has a property
John Searle calls aspectual shape. What does this mean? Not surprisingly, there is
no philosophically innocent formulation of this concept, i.e. a formulation, which
might be a commonly accepted starting point. However, to begin, let me put it as
follows: aspectual shape means that my access to reality is necessarily conditioned
by my point of view, perspective, mechanisms of perception and information-
processing, by the concepts applied etc.
Searle writes:
Noticing the perspectival character of conscious experience is a good way to
remind ourselves that all intentionality is aspectual. Seeing an object from a
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point of view, for example, is seeing it under certain aspects and not others. In
this sense, all seeing is ‘‘seeing as’’. And what goes for seeing goes for all
forms of intentionality, conscious and unconscious. All representations
represent their objects, or other conditions of satisfaction, under aspects.
Every intentional state has what I call an aspectual shape. (Searle 1992,
p. 131)
Note that shape is a metaphor here, and it does not refer only to visually
discriminated contours of an object; together with Searle, when it comes to a shape,
I mean any cognitively accessible appearance of an object (or many objects).
Someone might argue that aspectual shape is merely the result of applying
concepts. If I perceive something as an apple, it means that I spontaneously apply
the concept of apple to a certain perceptual material. But Searle is aware of the fact
that the problem of aspectuality is not exhausted by the conceptual content of
experience; categorization is rather a final step of, so to speak, aspectual shaping of
cognition. He writes:
So these features hang together: structuredness, perception as, the aspectual
shape of all intentionality, categories, and the aspect of familiarity. Conscious
experiences come to us as structured, those structures enable us to perceive
things under aspects, but those aspects are constrained by our mastery of a set
of categories, and those categories, being familiar, enable us, in varying
degrees, to assimilate our experiences, however novel, to the familiar. (Ibid.,
p. 136)
Thus we can say that the notion of aspectual shape exhibits the fact that when I
perceive something (or think about something, desire something, imagine some-
thing, etc.), the object of my perception or intention is always present in some way,
as this or that. For example, I now perceive the object in front of me as a wall and
the object hanging on the wall as a painting, etc.
But at least in case of perception this characterisation is still highly ambiguous,
since by standard distinguishing two levels of perception—the arrangement of the
perceptual field and the conceptualisation thereof—we obtain at least two possible
levels of aspectual shape:
(I) the object A (we might say: ready-made or complete object A) is conceptua-
lised in many different ways—as B, C, etc.
(II) the object is no longer ready-made or complete but turns out to result from a
combination of different ‘‘atoms of experience’’. Simple impressions, ideas,
sense data, sensations or inputs are combined/interpreted as A (this is the view
of Descartes and various empiricists from Locke and Hume to contemporary
cognitive psychology). Here when we say that perception is aspectual we
mean that those ‘‘atoms’’ could probably be arranged in many different ways.
The point (I) brings us to the problem of the adequacy of conceptualisation: does
the arrangement of the world into the specific groups we owe to concepts reflect the
arrangement of the world itself?
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As to (II) it is here that perceptual realism face even more difficult challenge:
what is the relation between the organisation of our percepts and the organisation of
the world? Is there a relation at all? And is there any order in the world independent
of the order of our percepts? In particular, is the world as such made up of
substances, processes, events and the other types of beings known to us, or are all of
these merely figments of our minds?
The tension between the phenomenon of aspectual shape and realism is indeed a
serious issue—even if this old idea of ‘‘atoms of experience’’ mentioned in (II) is
controversial. How is perceptual realism possible in light of aspectual shape?
Admittedly Searle is also aware of this, and argues against the anti-realistic position
known as perspectivism, which he considers to stem from a particular misunder-
standing of aspectual shape and perspectivity. He claims that from the fact that I
represent a particular object in a number of different ways, that my access to the
real object is perspective-dependent, I cannot derive the claim that the object itself
is perspective-dependent or aspectual. The point being that aspectuality belongs to
representations, and not to the things represented. The argument is surprisingly
brief. Why does Searle consider it sufficient?
First, Searle considers aspectual shape a solution, or at least part of a solution to a
certain problem—the problem of intentionality. In other words, the notion of
aspectual shape belongs to the theory seeking to explain the mechanism of
intentionality. Meanwhile the phenomenon of aspectual shape also—perhaps even
above all—elicits a number of fundamental questions, not so much about the
mechanism as about the very possibility of intentionality, i.e. the possibility of a
conscious cognitive relation to the real world. In this interesting manner the
category of aspectual shape makes an appearance both on the side of questions and
on that of answers.
Second, locating aspectual shape among answers and not among questions seems
natural to Searle because he presupposes the existence of the real world, the
existence of ordinary things and credibility of the structure of experience, and—
although his notion of representation is specific (it is transplanted from his
philosophy of language), allowing him to stay direct realist—he accepts the
representational character of the mind–world relation.
The representational account of aspectual shape is the thesis against which I am
briefly going to argue. This account is truly dominant, both among professional
scholars and in popular dictionaries.1 From this point on, perception will be my
main concern.
2 Aspectual Shape and Qua-Theory
I’m going to shed some light on the discussed problem from another perspective.
Aspectual shape usually comes to light in expressions of one particular kind, for
example ‘‘Smith as a human being is rational’’ or ‘‘Human beings qua rational are
1 See for example the website PhilosophyDictionary.org: http://www.philosophy-dictionary.org/
Dictionary-of-Philosophy-of-Mind/aspectual_shape.
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risible’’. In the case of perception: ‘‘I see this as a table’’, ‘‘I perceive the ball as
round’’ (see Chisholm 1957). ‘‘Qua’’ is the Latin equivalent of ‘‘as’’ and is used
mainly by logicians or by other scholars for certain technical purposes.
Let us suppose that expressions A, B and C are names. We do not decide now
what kind of names they are and to what kind of beings they refer—whether they
refer to substances, concrete properties, abstract properties, concepts, descriptions,
ideas etc. Expressions of the type ‘‘A is B qua C’’ or ‘‘A qua C is B’’ are qua
propositions, while ‘‘qua C’’ is a qua phrase. For example: Smith qua man is
rational, Smith qua friend is helpful. ‘‘Qua theory’’ is the name given to the study of
qua propositions by Poli (1994, 1998), while Ba¨ck (1996) has used a more
traditional term—‘‘theory of reduplication’’ (see also Angelelli 1978). The object of
qua theory are qua propositions—their structure, meaning and sometimes also their
cognitive function.
The thesis on aspectual shape can thus be put as follows: whenever our
acquaintance with the world is expressed by propositions (possibility of a non-
propositional knowledge is not denied; it is not discussed here), it is adequately
expressed only by qua propositions of a certain form. In qua theory we are thus not
studying the phenomenon of aspectual shape itself but, so to speak, preparing to do
so by determining how aspectual shape makes itself known on the level of
knowledge as it is commonly understood, i.e. as a certain set of propositions.
Benardete (1989) claims that ‘‘qua’’ is a particle of representation. This means
that when I move from Smith to Smith qua prime minister I take a step from the
level of external reality to the domain of mental representation. The qua proposition
simply informs that I represent Smith as a prime minister. From the logical and
epistemological point of view, according to Benardete the function of ‘‘qua’’ is
precisely this: to reveal the move from the external realm of facts to the internal
domain of thoughts, models; i.e. from the domain of being to the domain knowing.
From this, due to the convention connecting aspectual shape with qua propositions,
we obtain a more general thesis that investigation of aspectual shape belongs to
representational (indirect-realist) tradition in philosophy sharply distinguishing
being and knowing. Dretske (1997) locates aspectual shape on the level of
representation as well, although he stresses rather the selection of external, observed
properties during world-mind information transferring than the internal categori-
zation which comes afterwards. Last propositions of Shani (2010) and Agam-Segal
(2014) stay in the same representational spirit. I’d like to show briefly how they are
wrong. ‘‘Qua’’ has much bigger potential, and so does aspectual shape.
As to qua propositions I will focus on only one issue at this point. Note that in the
qua proposition of the type ‘‘A qua B is C’’, ‘‘A qua B’’ functions as a name—thus
an expression denoting an object. Using Kit Fine’s (1982) terminology I shall call it
the qua object. The qua proposition expresses the attribution of the feature C to the
qua object A qua B.
Fine introduces the category of qua object in order to give an ontological
explanation of the constitution of the material things we encounter in everyday life.
Here is the example: the monument of Goliath in front of me cannot be identical to
the bronze of which it is made. If melted, the monument would cease to exist, even
though the bronze would subsist. On the other hand, the thing and its form are not
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identical. First, because while the bronze is the recipient or embodiment of the
artist’s intention, the monument itself is not an intention—it is a concrete thing, the
actualisation of an intention. Second, we can imagine that a perfect copy of an
ancient statue would nonetheless differ from the original, that is, by virtue of being a
different concrete. Drawing on the ideas of Aristotle, Fine argues that the material
thing is a formal-material structure, while the category of qua object—a theoretical
tool—is what makes it possible to apprehend it. In his view, the qua object A qua B
is, so to speak, A wearing the property B, or A with the property B exhibited. The
qua object is an amalgam of the object (called base) and of the property it exhibits
(called gloss). For example, Socrates qua philosopher, Socrates qua husband, the
piece of bronze qua monument of Goliath. Qua objects are not a distinct category of
beings. Philosophical analysis reveals all of the objects we ordinarily encounter to
be qua objects.
Fine made the notion of qua object a part of his ontology of substance, not theory of
cognition, knowledge or perception. An exhibited property is thus the same as an
unexhibited one. In other words, the exposure of a property is not modified by
cognition and is not an ontologically significant event. For example, in case of Socrates
qua philosopher, the property of being a philosopher belongs to Socrates indepen-
dently of his occurrence in the qua object. Meanwhile, it seems that an exhibition of an
object (and of its properties) is always an exhibition for someone equipped with such
and such cognitive tools, with a particular viewpoint, in a particular context. The qua
objects I encounter are exposures for me. Socrates qua philosopher is a qua object
based on Socrates and his properties, but at the same time this qua object is relative to
particular context; first—to the society, in which there is a social role called ‘‘a
philosopher’’. I guess that the very same properties of Socrates himself (his intellectual
and moral capacities) would be exhibited, thus different qua object would appear, if
social roles were written differently (note here that in fact being a philosopher now is
not the same role as being a philosopher three hundred years ago, although both roles
are probably based on the same human properties and capacities). So, if the category of
qua object is to be of any use in elucidating the aspectual shape, then the property
exhibited or exposed has to be to some extent a novel type of quality belonging to the
thing; and we have to be able to conceptualise this difference.
Having said that, I’m going back to qua propositions. Note that it is unclear
whether in the other type of qua proposition, namely ‘‘A is C qua B’’, the qua phrase
is attached to C or to the whole of ‘‘A is C’’. In the first case, we are dealing with the
attribution of a complex feature—C qua B—to an object A. Let us call this the qua
feature. In the second case, an ordinary feature C is ascribed to an ordinary object—
A, but the ascription itself is in some way dependent on B.
In order to illustrate these distinctions, let us consider three examples:
(Smith is agile) qua football player—we are talking about Smith, while the qua
proposition represents the following mental leap (see Poli 1994, 1998): since
Smith is a football player, and we know that football players are agile, then Smith
is agile. What we find out is that the attribution of the feature occurs under certain
conditions, in some sort of context, because of something. From the viewpoint of
logic, we not only obtain knowledge about the predicates that can be applied to
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Smith, but also about their order. In Ba¨ck’s account, such a qua proposition is an
abbreviation of some kind of reasoning (in classical terms—of some kind of
syllogism).
But not all qua propositions are syllogisms. Just look at this:
(Smith qua football player) is agile—Smith, exhibiting the property of being a
football player or Smith in the role of a football player is agile, but no longer
necessarily so as a karate fighter or swimmer. Here in the end we have not said
anything about Smith himself, but only about Smith in a certain capacity or Smith
playing certain role.
Smith is (agile qua football player)—Smith is agile, but (something that we also
want to announce) he is so in a certain way. For example, he is agile in some way
that is characteristic of football players and differs from the way in which karate
fighters or swimmers are agile. It seems that an important characteristic of the qua
feature is that none of the features that combine to form it can be predicated of the
object independently of the others, or—if ascribed independently—each of them
will have a different meaning than when ascribed in unison.
In all cases the qua phrase in some way modifies that which it is attached to. We
may therefore distinguish three modifications:
(a) Qua predication: (A is C) qua B.
(b) Predication about the qua object: (A qua B) is C.
(c) Attribution of the qua feature: A is (B qua C).
Note that from the point of view of grammar, in (a), ‘‘qua’’ is a functor whose
slots are filled with a sentence on the left and a name on the right, as a result of
which we obtain a sentence (similarly—despite a reversed order—as in an
intensional context, i.e. ‘‘…knows that…’’); in (b) and (c) the slots are filled with
names and produce a new name. This grammatical difference is followed by the
logical and in fact also by the ontological one.
In (a) the qua phrase modifies the attribution of the feature but the ordinary
feature is still ascribed to an ordinary object. However in (b) the qua phrase
expresses the modification of the object to which the feature is ascribed and hence
this object is not an ordinary one but the qua object. Finally in (c) the qua phrase
expresses the modification of the feature ascribed. The object with the feature is an
ordinary object, however, at this point the feature is ontologically special (a type of
amalgam of features). I am going to omit case (c).
Now, if ‘‘qua’’ really means ‘‘represented qua’’—as Benardete postulates—then
we can easily see that (a) and (b) refer to different objects.
In Benardete’s (1989) account, in (a) that about which we predicate is object A.
What we announce is that within representation C it has the ascribed property B.
(a)* (A is B) represented qua C
On the other hand, if we accept Benardete’s proposal, then in (b) that about
which we predicate is not object A, but its representation. We are stating that a
definite representation of A (representation qua C) has a certain property—B.
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(b)* (A represented qua C) is B
Since predicating about a represented object should be distinguished from
predicating about the representation of an object, a qua predication and predicating
about a qua object are truly not the same procedure. Moreover because of the nature
of the problem we have set out to treat, expression (b)* will not be of interest to us.
Unlike cognitive psychologists, we are not concerned with observable, experimen-
tally distinguishable properties of representations themselves, but—on philosoph-
ically more fundamental level—with how our access to the real world—in the light
of aspectual shape—is possible.
Proposition (a) is naturally combined with representationalism—(a) naturally
means (a)*—but (b) can hardly be understood in this manner as long as we want to
speak of the world, not of representations themselves. Thus (b) naturally direct us—
against Benardete—toward a non-representational account of ‘‘qua’’. However it is
still unclear what account this could be. I’m going to give a sample of it.
3 What Is (Aspectual) Appearance? Against Dichotomies
Let me start with general remark. The recognition of aspectual shape stands for the
recognition that the world around us is a phenomenon or appearance—a recognition
made by the Greeks at the very beginning of philosophy and science, and in a sense
repeated over and over again in new contexts. This is the fundamental awareness of
the fact that what we know as reality is conditioned by our cognitive capacities and
perspective. In other words, the world I perceive (the world I live in) is always a
presentation of reality appropriate for my cognitive apparatus, it is my world or the
world, in a sense, designed for me; the world showing itself in some way to me. In
this respect, there is a fundamental difference between minded creatures and the rest
of the world. As Tim Crane writes, the ‘‘minded creature is one for which things are
a certain way: the way they are from that creature’s perspective’’ (Crane 2002, p. 4).
Notice however that unlike in the representational account, in this—more
fundamental—approach aspectual shape is not the result of my acting with a
cognitive apparatus, but results from my being such and such a creature—including
my location, structure, embodiment and way of existing.
As regards this fundamental recognition, there are various philosophical
attitudes. Starting with Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato until Descartes and finally
Husserl there constantly appeared the idea that this, as it were, epistemic
condition—aspectual and perspective-dependent—and way of existing is depress-
ing, with our everyday cognitive apparatus held responsible, although special
practices or methods can lead us to ideal knowledge and show us the world (the
external or at least the internal) in itself. Perhaps Protagoras, perhaps the ancient
skeptics, and certainly Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, decisively claimed
that this epistemic condition is unavoidable and hence it makes no sense to treat it as
a depressing weakness or even a punishment.
We can thus see that aspectual shape concerns the most profound issues related to
the very nature of minded creatures and cognized reality. And although there is
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nothing wrong with the representational account, I would argue that the aspectuality
of representation is the result of much more fundamental issues, and that it is from
these issues that we should proceed with our philosophical work. However,
someone might argue that if we formulate our approach to aspectual shape in this
manner, we can forget about realism. ‘‘If the world we live in is somehow
conditioned by our epistemic situation—the polemist continues—then it is simply
not a real world, but merely a phenomenon, something inside our minds. This is
idealism’’. I will argue against this claim. Let me make some highlights at the
beginning of this section:
• A phenomenon is not merely a phenomenon, since phenomenal is not the
opposite of real.
• Being conditioned by the mind does not necessarily mean being inside the mind
and being produced by the mind.
Now let me elaborate on these statements, first from the historical perspective.
Influenced by the physics of his time (especially optics), Rene´ Descartes recognized
the phenomenal character of the perceived world applying three oppositions:
external world—internal sphere of the subject; physical world—world of thoughts,
ideas; and consequently: body–mind (see Descartes 1996). We are now interested in
the first two. Following Descartes, we are tempted to think in terms of external and
internal realms, hence everything must be located either in the external world or in
the internal realm of the subject. As Ku¨ng (1973) writes, the Cartesian subject is a
closed box filled with impressions (or ideas, sense-data—atomic inputs and complex
representations). Moreover, both external things and subjects are ready-made (the
metaphor of Putnam 1982), solid substances of a completely different nature—one
physical, the other mental. If so, then the only possible relation between them is
causation or some transfer of information. To put it succinctly: mind is by definition
(as long as we are looking at concepts) clean and clear of the physical (although
they are in fact connected), and the physical is clean and clear of thought. Think of
the last claim and how it differs from the ancient and medieval worldview, where
physical reality was also the domain of logos (see Brown 2008).
Thus we can see that the Cartesian recognition of aspectual shape automatically
forces us to ascribe aspectuality to representations—the internal equivalents (made
ready by the conscious mind) of external things (ready-made independently of
consciousness). But there is no reason to treat this paradigm as the only one
possible. As a matter of fact, although very plausible in many contexts, the
Cartesian paradigm gave rise to several crucial, well-established problems in other
areas. To put it briefly: if the internal and the external are separate realms, how
could the latter be accessible to the former. If matter does not exist in the space of
reasons (see Sellars 1956; McDowell 1996), how can the former be the reference
and basis of rational construction called knowledge; if the domain of matter and the
domain of thought are so different, how can the former be intelligible? (see
Po´łtawski 2000). The critique of this Cartesian way of conceptualizing mind–world
relation comes from many differring areas of research—for instance, from post-
cognitive psychology, based on radical constructivist position in theoretical biology
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(see Maturana 1978; Riegler 2006) and ecological conception of Gibson (1979) on
the one hand, and theory of the perception of art on the other (see Pepperell 2012).
In the first half of the twentieth century there were at least two philosophers
who—independently—decided to examine more closely the Cartesian approach to
the mind–world relation: Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Husserl (1901,
1913) attempts to resolve the difficulties of the Cartesian paradigm from the
Cartesian perspective—the perspective of the conscious subject. Thus he doesn’t
eliminate the mind-box as the behaviorists and materialists do but tries to rethink the
possibility of knowledge from the perspective of the conscious subject—by
conceptually (since philosophy is a conceptual story) opening the box from inside.
In other words, Husserl wants to remain with Descartes, since the author of
‘‘Meditations on First Philosophy’’ rightly stressed the fact that the world in which I
live is always—in Crane’s terms—the world for me. However, Husserl doesn’t
accept the Cartesian claim that the world for me is some internal equivalent of the
real (external) world. It is not in my head.
4 Wittgenstein on Aspectual Presentations
I want to say a little bit more about Ludwig Wittgenstein since his explicit refutation
of the Cartesian paradigm is complete and closely related to the problem of
aspectuality, as recognized by Wittgenstein himself. The departure point for his
reflections on the aspectuality of visual perception are situations in which seeing
something is essentially the realisation of one of several possibilities. This happens
even when the object seen has not changed in any way. In the most simple example,
Wittgenstein writes, I see a face and I am suddenly struck by its resemblance to
another. I see the same thing, yet differently. This is the moment when aspect
appears (perception of a face is one of many examples of aspect-seeing that
Wittgenstein gives—Budd 1987 discusses the exhaustive list). Here we may also
cite the well-known duck–rabbit illusion by Joseph Jastrow—a picture which can be
seen in two ways, as a duck or as a rabbit.
We could simply assume that in aspectual seeing we are merely interpreting or
representing a certain object in different ways. But we would then have to
differentiate between the object and its interpretation (representation). In reality,
however, such a distinction is impracticable. Wittgenstein notes that we see a given
figure exactly as we interpret it—the interpretation is the perception, and the
perception is the interpretation [interestingly, even if we move from philosophical
armchair to the domain of cognitive psychology, there are experiments available,
showing how amalgamated perception and interpretation are; see Chambers and
Reisberg (1985)].
In other words, the description ‘‘I see x as A’’, and following the dawning of a
new aspect—‘‘I see x as B’’ would make sense to me only if I were able to speak of
x as such, independently of A as well as B. And yet before I noticed B my
experience could not have been that of seeing x as A, because at that point I saw no
other option. I simply saw A. I thus never see and never think about x as such. The
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x alone—in Fine’s (1982) terms, the base of qua object—is never isolated as a
theme of reflection from the ordinary first-person perspective.
Budd (1987) argues that the phenomenon of aspectual seeing is crucial to
Wittgenstein’s understanding of mind, since it is in the mind that the two factors
jointly forming the world of experience (phenomenal world)—sense data and their
mental apprehension—come together. Budd writes of the juncture of the sensory
and the intellectual, while Wittgenstein himself speaks of an amalgam of seeing and
thinking. An amalgam is much more than a juncture; it is a certain type of
indissoluble whole.
If we distinguish representation or representational content from the pure sensory
experience (see Peacocke 1983) at its base, we may suppose that aspectual plurality
occurs at the representational level. Different representational content may, after all,
reflect the same sensation. Regardless of the arguments for and against this general
account, it seems that it is not Wittgenstein’s view. If aspectual seeing is an
amalgam, an enduring compound of seeing and thinking, it is essentially impossible
to distinguish any separable components in it, such as sensation and a mental frame
ready to grasp it.
The above rejection of the representational interpretation of Wittgenstein is
above all founded on his critique of the way in which the subject (thus also thinking)
is described in ordinary language and psychology, where the internal–external
dichotomy is applied. This way of thinking (in fact the Cartesian way)—
Wittgenstein claims—stems from the tendency to create images of mental life. If
we look at the definition of thought as a picture of the facts provided in ‘‘Tractatus
logico-philosophicus’’ (see Wittgenstein 1922) we might say that the problem is
thinking about thinking (and by further analogy, thinking about experience, thinking
about emotion, etc.; cognitive psychology calls these phenomena ‘‘metacognition’’).
In this way, for example, merely tasting a dessert is not in any way problematic, but
thinking about tasting a dessert generates questions like: what happens when I eat a
piece of cake and where does it happen? We imagine a certain process located in a
distinct type of ‘‘space’’.
Wittgenstein (1953) does not claim that states like the experience of satisfaction
or remembering do not exist but wants to correct our way of thinking about these
and other similar mental events, correct our way of visualising them. The author of
‘‘Philosophical Investigations’’ does not defend an eliminativist position similar to
that of Churchland (1995), according to whom our mental life is in fact the outcome
of a false theory, but comes closer to Ryle (1949), who regards the conception of the
mind as a certain type of interior as resulting from a categorical error. Wittgenstein
claims that the problem with the category of ‘‘internal image’’ is that it is modelled
after the ‘‘external image’’. Analogously—we might say in the spirit of Ryle—
mental states and phenomena are modelled after states and phenomena in the
physical world. In other words, even if we agree that remembering something is not
a physical phenomenon, our way of thinking about phenomena in general is
conditioned by observed physical ones. Hence even though mental phenomena have
different properties than physical ones, the mere fact that they are phenomena
makes them appear to us as beings of the same type, thus having to occur
somewhere, within some kind of space.
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The critique of the Cartesian approach to the mind and cognition presented in
‘‘Philosophical Investigations’’ echoes the conception of the metaphysical subject
and the position identified in ‘‘Tractatus logico-philosophicus’’ as solipsism—a
solipsism Wittgenstein intends to coincide with realism. There is one astonishing
fact about this conception: rejection of Cartesianism results from the diligent
application of Cartesian method.
Let me point out that aside from optics, there is probably one more paradigmatic
scientific achievement that may help us to understand Cartesian way of thinking—
chemistry. Although Descartes dies before the birth of modern chemistry, he is
aware of the fact that in empirical reality everything is complex and mixed. Hence,
substance can be revealed by analysis—just as in chemistry, where the separation of
simpler components and finally elements is never a given but always an
achievement. His conceptual search for substantive, pure subjectivity—who am I
truly if not my body, my relations with other people, etc.—is really like the
chemical analysis of some complex liquid in search of the appropriate acid, base or
salt (it is interesting, that an analogy with chemistry was used also by psychologists
in nineteenth century).
Now, in the apparently Cartesian spirit Wittgenstein (1922) claims that the
reference of the name ‘‘world’’ can only be the world in which I live, something that
cannot be thought without a subject—without me (theses 5.6, 5.62, 5.621, 5.53).
How else—the author of ‘‘Tractatus…’’ seems to ask—could I assign meaning to
the word ‘‘world’’? What would it refer to?
On the other hand, however, pursuing Cartesian chemical-like analysis in order to
‘‘extract’’ the subject, to exhibit the nature of pure subjectivity, to make some
‘‘distillation’’ of this pure subjectivity as opposed to world, Wittgenstein arrives at a
conception of the subject (he speaks of the metaphysical subject) who is in no way
capable of creating the world. For this subject is ‘‘extensionless’’, thus without an
interior (this issue will later be developed in ‘‘Philosophical Investigations’’) out of
which it could project private worlds of its own making (theses 5.631, 5.632, 5.633).
Radical Cartesian ‘‘distilation’’ shows that there is no room for subjectivity inside
the empirical reality. The metaphysical subject is not a part of the world—
Wittgenstein claims—it is the world’s limit. It is a point establishing the limit of the
known reality. It is like an eye in relation to the eyeshot—an eyeshot is by definition
ascribed to an eye, but there is no eye inside the eyeshot. The notions of inside and
outside make no sense in this context—as in the case of the metaphysical subject
and the perceived world.
Now, let us naturally suppose that if something is not a product of mental activity
of any kind (including dreams and hallucinations), then it is real (there is no a priori
reason why a thing which is a product of mental activity could not be real as well,
but this is an issue for another investigation). Since—according to Wittgenstein—
the world cannot be produced by the metaphysical subject, it is real. We thus have a
world, which really exists (and so we remain within realism), while at the same time
the idea of existence of the world makes sense only if it is ‘‘someone’s’’ world, if its
existence is for someone (again, propositions 5.6, 5.62, 5.621, 5.53). This is a key
moment. The ‘‘existence of the world’’ means something only if it is a presence to
someone, if the world is ‘‘ascribed’’ to someone (thesis 5.64), thus if the world
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presents itself. Since ‘‘the world is my world’’ (thesis 5.62), and hence the world and
life are one (thesis 5.621), the existence of the world I live in is identical to its
presenting itself to me—its presenting itself in my life.
From this point of view, some passages from ‘‘Philosophical Investigations’’
could be considered a development of the idea briefly sketched out in 5.621 (of
course this claim requires more detailed reflection); an analysis of the subject, yet
not from a purely philosophical point of view in which the subject is reduced to an
extensionless point, a limit, but from the perspective of the subjective life.
Wittgenstein’s late remarks treat of the living subject which establishes the limits,
framework and shape of its world through its form of life, language games, and
aspectual seeing. It is then clear that Wittgenstein’s aspectuality is a property of
seeing and at the same time a property of the world I live in, since this seeing is not
something external to the world but one of the factors determining its shape—as in
the duck–rabbit illusion, determining if what we live in is the world with a rabbit or
the world with a duck.
The opposition of the external to the internal, of being to knowing, is the core of
the representational account of mind and world. However, in his approach to
aspectuality Wittgenstein rejects both [for more exhaustive investigations of aspect-
seeing in Wittgenstein’s philosophy see the impressive collection of papers edited
by Day and Krebs (2010)].
5 Conclusion: Cognition, Aspects and Ready-Making
In conclusion it should again be noted and highlighted that in this non-Cartesian
account of aspectual shape the whole cognitive process of interacting with the world
is not described in terms of agreement between the internal state or object and a
(presumed) external object. This is an altogether different type of ontology. This is
not the place to develop a detailed proposal, but it seems that the mind–world
relation, instead of being a transmission of information between the two realms, is
here a kind of activation as a result of which the world does not come into being—
the world is not created by the mind—but comes into existence in some particular
shape. Thus the world is activated or—to use Putnam’s (1982) metaphor—is made
ready in a shape adapted to our senses, categories, values. This activation, ready-
making or adaptation to cognitive capacities of a subject is a presentation of the
world.
In this context, the phenomenon of aspectuality consists in the fact that there are
different possible ways of making the same object ready. We may thus say that qua
object A qua B, is a particular activation of real item A or its presentation ascribed
to a given point of view and cognitive apparatus; or it is—in Fregean terms—the
way, in which A is given [see Angelelli (1967), Wolniewicz (1977) who elaborate
Frege’s theory of senses/aspects]. Possibly, the idea of aspectual giveness could be
interestingly compared with the idea of affordances, proposed by Gibson (1979).
Affordances are, in a sense, ‘‘messages’’ sent by things to an active subject
(regarding his possible actions among these things), thus they are not produced by a
subject; they are grounded in reality (if so, then A qua B could be A with the
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affordance B exhibited). Here the general idea is that reality gives us much more
than mere physical stimuli [in this context see also the results of Leyton (1989),
showing that perception of a shape conveys information about the causal history of
an object].
‘‘A qua B’’ means then ‘‘A presenting itself qua B’’ or ‘‘A given qua B’’. In
propositions of the type ‘‘I perceive A qua B’’ I do not report the way in which A is
actively represented by me; I do not report ascription of any property to the thing
perceived; I do not report any reasoning accompanying perception; I do report what
I am faced with. The report is directed toward reality, not toward cognition itself.
Qua object is the appearance of some part of reality in the space of reasons, and as
such it makes all further cognitive actions—inter alia representing and reasoning—
possible. Things that we consciously live within are in fact qua objects—ways in
which reality reveals itself. If we consider, following Nagel (1974), the case of a bat
having entirely different cognitive apparatus than humans have, then we may say
that bats live in the same reality but within different qua objects.
More complex proposition ‘‘(A qua B) is C’’ is the ascription of some property to
particular presentation of A—to qua object based on A. This is what we do
everyday. The category of qua object, invented by Fine for rather different purposes,
becomes a modern logical tool enabling us to rediscover the fundamental
recognition that the world around us is a phenomenon; that the world we know is
fitted to our cognitive capacities and available perspectives.
Thus the aspectual shape of representations is a derivative of a much more basic
fact, namely of the aspectual shape of the world we live in. We can thus conclude
that:
• A phenomenon is not merely a phenomenon, and it does not stand in opposition
to reality, since the phenomenal is the activation of the real, a completion of it.
Developing and paraphrasing Crane’s (2002) idea we can say that not only do
minded creatures stand out as having a world (the world is of some kind to them),
but that a world containing minded creatures has to differ in some way from a world
without such beings. Only the first of these is ceaselessly developed by cognitive
activations and, so to speak, enriched by them.
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